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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
COMMON CAUSE, a District of
Columbia, non-profit corporation and MARJORIE J. THOMAS, an
Individual,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
Appeal No. 15685

vs.
UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
and MILLY 0. BERNARD, OLOF E.
ZUNDEL and KENNETH RIGTRUP, in
their capacities as COMMISSIONERS
of the PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defendants and Appellants,
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY,
Defendant-Intervenor and
Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY

ISSUES RAISED BY THE COMMON CAUSE BRIEF
This Reply will be directed to those issues as to
which new matter, citation of authority or argument has
been raised by COMMON CAUSE in its Brief for the first
time.

The Reply will focus on the following issues:
1.

The attempt of COMMON CAUSE to raise for the

first time in this appeal the Administrative Rule Haking
Act as a basis for the jurisdiction of the District Court.
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2.

The claim of COMMON CAUSE that the Administrative

Rule Making Act excuses it from pursuing its administrative
remedies.
3.

The claim that Utah case law prohibits the COMMIS-

SION from acting in a quasi-judicial, adjudicatory manner.
4.

The contention that the protection of due process

does not apply to the COMMISSION.
5.

The argument that MOUNTAIN FUEL's construction of

the Open and Public Meetings Act requires this Court to
engage in "judicial law making".
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING ACT DOES
NOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR JURISDICTION
OF THE DISTRICT COURT
With total disregard for the long standing rule of
this Court that issues which were not raised before the
trial court cannot be presented for the first time on
appeal,

!/ COMMON CAUSE suggests in its Brief that the

jurisdiction of the District Court was predicated upon the
provisions of the Administrative Rule Making Act, found in
Title 63, Chapter 46 of the Utah Code.
as a result of a fatal procedural flaw.

Such argument fails
The Administra-

tive Rule Making Act was at no time cited to the Court

lf

E.g., DeEry and Hilton Travel Serv., Inc. v. International Airways,
Inc., (Utah No. 15219 Aug. 10, 1978); American Oil Co. v. The Generai
Contracting Corp., 17 Utah 2d. 330, 411 P.2d 486 (1966); North Salt
Lake v. Saint Joseph Water & Irr. Co., 118 Utah 600, 223 P.2d
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
577 (1950).
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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below as the jurisdictional basis for the claim, COMMON
CAUSE having relied exclusively on the provisions of the
2/
Utah Declaratory Judgment Act.That change in theory
cannot be raised now for the first time.
Even the long standing prohibition against raising an
issue for the first time on appeal aside, however, the
Administrative Rule Making Act would not have provided
COMMON CAUSE with a jurisdictional basis had it been
raised in the Court below.

It is apparent from even the

most casual reading of the Act that it was intended to
prescribe the procedures to be utilized by public agencies
in exercising their formal rule making powers.

For example,

notice of intent to adopt a rule must be given and all
interested parties must be provided an opportunity to
submit their views.~/

Copies of the rules so adopted are

to be filed with the State Archivist, who must then compile, index and publish them.!/

Interested persons may

petition the public agency for amendment or repeal of a

rule,~/ and the validity or applicability of such a rule
may be challenged by declaratory judgment action before a
District Court.~/

The COMMISSION determination of which

y

section 78-33-1 et. seq., Utah Code Ann.

3/

sections 63-46-4

iJ

Sectlons 63-46-4, 6

5/

Sections 63-46-8 Utah Code Ann.

&

5 Utah Code Ann.
&

(Repl. vol. 1977)

(Repl. vol. 1978)

7 Utah Code Ann ..

(Repl. vol. 1978)

(Repl. vol. 1978)

Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
digitization
provided vol.
by the Institute
of Museum and Library Services
§_!
Section
63-46-9
UtahFunding
CodeforAnn.
(Repl.
1978)
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the Appellants now complain, on the other hand, was not
a rule adopted under this formal procedure but had its
genesis in quite a different environment.
The application of the 1977 amendments to the Open
and Public Meeting Act to the deliberative sessions of the
COMMISSION following an open adjudicatory hearing first
arose as a procedural issue during the pendency of several
general rate cases in the summer of 1977

(including the

MOUNTAIN FUEL General Rate case, P.S.C. Docket No. 77-05703).

The COMMISSION requested and obtained on August 15,

1977 a written legal opinion from the Attorney General of
the State of Utah advising it that open deliberative
sessions in the pending matters were not required by the
Act.

(R.

255-60).

When the issue was again confronted in

the MOUNTAIN FUEL-Wexpro Litigation, P.S.C. Docket No. 76057-014, the Attorney General reiterated his opinion orally
before the COMMISSION on September 12, 1977.

(R.

69).

In

compliance with the position of the Attorney General, the
COMMISSION conducted its deliberative sessions in those
proceedings in the historical fashion.
When viewed against this procedural backdrop, it is
clear that the decision of the COMMISSION to continue its
past practice of holding its deliberative sessions in
private after a full adversarial hearing was not the
making of a "rule'' within the meaning of the Administrative Rule Making Act.

To the contrary, it was nothing

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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more than an intermediate procedural ruling made during
the course of an adjudicatory hearing.

It is a long

established principal of appellate review that such intermediate and interlocutory rulings and orders entered by a
lower tribunal are not to be attacked piecemeal, but are
rather merged into and become part of the final decision
from which the appeal is then taken.

5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal

and Error, §856; Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426,
73 P.2d 1277

(1937).

There is nothing to suggest that

these fundamental principles of orderly procedure are any
less applicable simply because the adversarial and adjudicatory hearing was held before an administrative agency
rather than a Court.
The Administrative Rule Making Act itself, recognizes
that such determinations do not come within the definition
of a rule.
1978)

In §63-46-3 (4) Utah Code Ann.

(Repl. vol.

"declaratory rulings" are expressly excluded from

the Act.

Section 63-46-10 defines declaratory rulings

as agency determinations of the "validity or applicability
of any statutory provision" to their proceedings.

Such

determination has "the same status as agency decisions or
orders in cases disposed of by the agency after hearing"
and would not, therefor, be subject to an action for
declaratory judgment but would be reviewable, in the
case of COMMISSION rulings, only in accordance with the
provisions of the Public Utilities Code.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The exclusion of "declaratory rulings" from the
operation of the Administrative Rule Making Act is entirely
consistent with prior holdings of this Court narrowing the
scope of judicial appellate review of administrative interpretation of statutes affecting the agencies procedures.
Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 17 Utah 2d 14, 403 P.2d
781, 784 (1965).
On the other hand, that policy of limited review would
be entirely frustrated if the interpretation of the Act
advanced by COMMON CAUSE were adopted.

No longer would

the decision of the COMMISSION be prima facie correct with
the scope of review limited to a determination of whether
the decision of the COMMISSION was in conformity "with the
general objectives [of] the agency" and was founded upon
a "rational basis".

Rather, under the system of review

advanced by COMMON CAUSE, the attempt of the District
Court to second guess the wisdom of the COMMISSION would
be on appeal, and the decision of the lower court and not
the COMMISISON would be entitled to the presumption of
validity.

Such a result is out of harmony with the long

standing public policy of this State and was clearly not
intended.
It is apparent that the arguments of COMMON CAUSE
simply will not withstand critical analysis.

At pages 10

and 11 of its Brief, COMMON CAUSE takes the position that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Section 54-7-16 Utah Code Ann.

(Repl. vol. 1974), which

grants the exclusive jurisdiction to review orders and
decisions of the COMMISSION to this Court, is inconsistent with the later provisions of the Administrative Rule
Making Act and that the exclusive jurisdiction of this
Court must therefor yield to the jurisdiction of the
District Court to render a declaratory judgment as
provided for in the latter statute.2/
created conflict is merely illusory.

This artifically
Decisions and

orders of the COMMISSION are not covered by the Administrative Rule Making Act.

A declaratory ruling which is

sought during the course of an administrative hearing is
to be treated as a decision or order and is, therefore,
appealable only to this Court.
or conflict?

Where is the inconsistency

The question provides its own answer.
POINT II

THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING ACT DID NOT
EXCUSE APPELLANTS FROM THE REQUIREMENT OF
PURSUING THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
As discussed in Point I hereinabove, the Administrative Rule Making Act has no application to the determination of the COMMISSION challenged herein.
the provisions of §63-46-9 Utah Code Ann.

As a result,
(Repl. vol.

1978) excusing an interested party from seeking a ruling
from the agency before filing a declaratory judgment

Section 63-46-2 Utah Code Ann. (Repl. vol. 1978) expressly provides that "all other provisions of law, to the extent they are
inconsistent or in conflict with this Act are repealed and superSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
ceded byLibrary
this
Act."
Services
and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

action with the District Court, have no application.
Since the COMMISSION determination on the application
of the Open and Public Meetings Act must, in fact and law,
be viewed as a decision or order, it is the administrative
remedy provision of the Public Utility Code which is
controlling.

The policy enunciated in said Code regarding

the judicial review of decisions and orders of the COMMISSION is quite clear.

There, the exhaustion of administra-

tive remedy through a petition for rehearing is an absolute
prerequisite to review by this Court.
Ann.

§54-7-15 Utah Code

(Repl. vol. 1974).
POINT III
THE CASE LAW CITED BY COMMON CAUSE DOES NOT
SUPPORT ITS POSITION THAT THE COMMISSION
MAY NOT ACT QUASI-JUDICIALLY
COMMON CAUSE spends a good part of its argument

creating a straw man over which there is no dispute while
missing the entire point of this appeal.

With great elan

COMMON CAUSE parades before this Court decisional precedent ranging from 1918 to 1941 in support of the unremarkable declaration that the COMMISSION, as a creation of the
legislature, may exercise only such powers as the legislature has delegated to it.

MOUNTAIN FUEL certainly has no

quarrel with that pronouncement.

Neither does MOUNTAIN

FUEL take exception with the maxim enunciated by these
cases that as a matter of the Constitutional separation of
powers, the legislature cannot delegate to the COMMISSION
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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those powers which belong to the judiciary.

These cases

do not, however, bridge the final chasm which COMMON CAUSE
attempts to cross.
Contrary to the inference which COMMON CAUSE tries to
draw, this Court has never declared that in exercising
legislatively granted powers the COMMISSION may not proceed quasi-judicially.
distinction.

COMMON CAUSE misses this critical

In summarizing the general case law, one

commentator has noted that the holding of a quasi-judicial
proceeding does not make the agency action hjudicial in
the restrictive constitutional sense" nor does it constitute an invasion of the "judicial powers".
Administrative Law, §172.

1 Am Jur. 2d,

This does not prevent, however,

said proceeding from being characterized as judicial or
quasi-judicial for other purposes.

The Am Jur citation

goes on to provide:
"The presence or absence of the power to
hear and determine in the sense of a power
and duty to receive evidence and to exercise
judgment and discretion in reaching a
decision on such evidence, especially in
connection with the presence or absence of
adverse parties, compulsory attendance and
examination of witnesses, etc., is an
important element in determining whether a
particular act is judicial or quasijudicial for procedural and other purposes.
A quasi-judicial proceeding is com
plete with notice, hearing, findings,
order and other requisites such as the
right to appeal. Thus, a function or
proceeding may be held judicial in nature
or quasi-judicial where a hearing is
required by the constitution or a statute,
the requirement of a hearing having reference to the tradition of judicial proSponsored by ceedings."
the S.J. Quinney Law Library.
Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
[Emphasis
added.]
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Even our legislature, which it must be presumed was
aware of the prior pronouncements of this Court that the
Public Service Commission could not exercise the powers
of the judiciary in the constitutional sense, has recognized that in exercising the functions delegated to it by
the legislature, the COMMISSION acts in a quasi-judicial
manner.~/

In Section 13-l-l. 3 Utah Code Ann.

1973), the legislature declared that the

(Repl. vol.

C0~1ISSION

was

not to be subject to the jurisdiction of the executive
director of the Department of Business Regulation when
exercising its "quasi-judicial or rule making functions"
and that the COMMISSION was to exercise its "quasijudicial anj rule making powers" in conformance with the
provision~

~f

~n~

Public Utilities Code.

The straw man of COMMON CAUSE simply misses the
point.

The issue here is not whether the legislatively

created COMMISSION can exercise only those powers constitutionally delegated to it by the legislature, but
rather, whether the Open and Public Meetings Act applies
to the COMMISSION when it sits as a quasi-judicial body

§!

It is a well settled principal of statutory construction that in
the reenactment, modification or amendment of statutory provisions
it is presumed that tre legislature has in mind and is aware of
prior judicial construction of those statutory provisions.
Anderson v. Cook, 102 Utah 265, 130 P.2d 278 (1912); Hirath v.
Pierce, 506 P.2d 548 (Okla. 1973). Therefore, in recognizing
that the Commission exercises certain "quasi-judicial powers

11

the

legislature was not referring to the delegation to the Commission
of powers reserved to the judicial branch of the government in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers, but must have
been referring to the judicial like procedures engaged in by the
Commission
in the
exercise
ofprovided
its by
legislatively
powers.
Sponsored by the
S.J. Quinney Law Library.
Funding
for digitization
the Institute of Museumdelegated
and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

in the conduct of an adjudicatory and adversarial hearing.

As set forth in the opening Brief of MOUNTAIN FUEL,

answer to that query is clear.

The Act has no application.

POINT IV
COMMON CAUSE HAS MISAPPREHENDED AND MISAPPLIED
THE PRINCIPLES OF DUE PROCESS TO
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
COMMON CAUSE argues at pages 24 and 25 of its Brief
that the due process arguments of MOUNTAIN FUEL exalt
form over substance and ignore the fact that the ultimate
object of the administrative proceeding is a legislative
act.

It is COMMON CAUSE and not MOUNTAIN FUEL, however,

who disregards the real substance of COMMISSION proceedure.
Rate making hearings before the COMMISSION are conducted
in a quasi-judicial setting and the strictures of due process are applicable.

That issue was finally laid to rest

in Utility Consumer Action Group v. Public Service Commission,

(No. 15049, Aug. 7, 1978) where this Court held

that denial by the COMMISSION of the right to present
evidence during a Utah Power & Light rate making proceeding was an abridgement of due process.
Virtually acknowledging that it may have overstated
its case, COMMON CAUSE, goes on to contend Lhat even if
due process is applicable to an administrative rate
making proceeding before the COMMISSION, such constitutional mandate does not require closed door deliberative
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated-11OCR, may contain errors.

sessions by the trier of fact.

As support for its

position, COMMON CAUSE cites Christiansen v. Harris, 109
Utah 1, 163 P.2d 314

(1945) as the sine qua non on the

issue of due process.

This case, it is argued, delineates

each and every element of due process and that unless
specifically mentioned therein, a procedural defect
cannot rise to the level of the Constitutional proscription.
It is clear upon closer examination, however, that
the Christiansen case was not intended nor can it be
construed as a catalog of each and every element of
procedural due process.

This Court has found a number of

due process elements which find no place in the Christiansen
list.

For example, in State v. Musser, 110 Utah 534, 175

P.2d 724

(lJ46J, vacated on other grounds, 333 U.S. 95

(1948), it was held that the failure to render a judgment
on evidence which is competent, relevant and material, is
a denial of due process.

Similarly, in Alirers vs Turner,

22 Utah 2d. 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969) the failure of the
Defendant to obtain effective representation of counsel
in a criminal case was found to be a denial of due process.

Again, no mention of that requirement can be found

in the four corners of the Christiansen opinion.
in State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477

Finally,

(Utah 1975) this Court

concluded that the deliberate suppressing of evidence by
a prosecutor violated due process.

Again, the Christiansen

case is silent on this principle.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Contrary to the attempt of COMMON CAUSE to fix a set
shopping list of the elements of due process, it is
apparent that this Constitutional concept must remain
flexible in its application and reach.
of due process is fairness.

The basic element

That concept simply cannot

be meted out through the application of some artificially
fixed standard.
420,

440

As noted in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S.

(1960):

"Due process is an illusive concept.
It's exact boundaries are undefinable,
and 1ts content var1es according to
specific factual contexts."
[Emphasis
added.]
As set forth in the opening Brief of MOUNTAIN FUEL,
the right to a fair and impartial tribunal is foundational
to the principles of due process.

The case law there

cited by MOUNTAIN FUEL demonstrates that to require the
trier of fact to conduct its deliberations in the open,
subject to the external pressures which would necessarily
follow,

so offends the basic requirement of a fair and

impartial tribunal as to be prohibited by the Constitutional due process mandate.
As a last gasp COMMON CAUSE attempts to turn the
argument around by contending that due process does not
prohibit but rather fosters open deliberations.

In so

arguing, COMMON CAUSE commits the fundamental error of
confusing the right to an open and fair hearing with the
right of the trier of fact to conduct its deliberations in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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chambers after such an open hearing.

If the demand of due

process were to the contrary, then why not demand that the
parties be admitted to the jury room to listen to and
offer comment and instruction upon the jury's consideration of the evidence; or why not subject our trial judges
to the requirement that they delineate in detail their
thought processes and deliberations in reaching their
Findings of Fact in a non-jury case?

Such an argument

must crumble under the weight of its own absurdity.
Finally, COMMON CAUSE attempts to avoid the impact of
the prevailing case law by declaring that such decisions~/
do not address the constitutional issue of due process in
holding that the Sunshine Statutes enacted in those jurisdictions do not apply to private deliberations after a
quasi-judicial public agency hearing simply ignores the
facts.

Each of those cases expressly adopts the dissent

in the Canney decision!Q/ so vigorously relied upon by
COMMON CAUSE.

Said dissent directly confronts the issue

of due process, arguing that the application of an Open
Meeting statute to such private deliberations would constitute a denial of due process and return us to "the

~

Jordan v. District of Columbia, 362 A.2d 114 (D.C. 1976);
B<;rnstein v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 376
A.2d 816 (D.C. 1977); DuPont Circle Citizens Assoc. v. District
of Columbia Bd. of zoning Adjustment, 364 A.2d 610 (D.C. 1976);
Arizona Press Club v. Arizona Bd. of Tax Appeals, 113 Ariz.
545, 548 P. 2d 697 (1976).

10/

Canney v. Bd. of Public Instruction of Alachua County,
260 (Fla. 1973).

278 So.2d
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Roman arena for a thumbs-up or a thumbs-down result by the
public clamor"

(278 So.2d 264).
POINT V

CONTRARY TO THE ALLEGATION OF COMMON CAUSE
MOUNTAIN FUEL HAS NOT ASKED THIS COURT
TO ENGAGE IN JUDICIAL LAWMAKING
COMMON CAUSE argues that in urging this Court to
recognize that the deliberative sessions of the COMMISSION
following a quasi-judicial adjudicatory hearing are exempted
from the Open and Public Meetings Act, MOUNTAIN FUEL is
seeking the exercise of judicial lawmaking.

The basis for

the exemption of such deliberative sessions from the Act
is set forth in detail in MOUNTAIN FUEL's opening Brief,
and that portion of the argument will not be repeated
It is sufficient to note that the construction of

herein.

the Act advanced by MOUNTAIN FUEL arises from and is
consistent with the clear and unambiguous language of the
statute and does not require the judicial lawmaking suggested by COMMON CAUSE.
Quite to the contrary, it is COMMON CAUSE which falls
prey to its own argument.

Its analysis of the Act is

conducted in a vacuum without any reference to purpose or
history.

To read the COMMON CAUSE Brief is to reach the

erroneous conclusion that the concept of open and public
meetings first broke upon the Utah Legislative scene in
1977.

Its argument simply ignores the fact that Utah had

an Open
and
Public
Actprovided
on by
its
books
forand some
22
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years prior to the convening of the 1977 legislature and
that the Act upon which COMMON CAUSE now relies was nothing more than an amendment and modification to the
already existing statute.

COMMON CAUSE fails to even

feign a response to the exposition of the legislative
history, the administrative agency construction of the
original Act and the intended impact of the 1977 Amendments as set forth in the opening Brief of MOUNTAIN FUEL.
Such failure is understandable, however, since an examination of that legislative background strips COMMON CAUSE
of its argument.
CONCLUSION
Declaratory rulings of the COMMISSION pertaining to
the application of the Open and Public Meetings Act to
COMMISSION proceedings is not a rule and the attempt of
COMMON CAUSE to belatedly, for the first time on this
appeal, pin its jurisdictional hopes upon the coat tails
of the Administrative Rule Making Act will not work.
Even assuming arguendo that the trial court did have
jurisdiction, the Brief of COMMON CAUSE falls far short of
providing the foundational material so necessary to shore
up the ill advised decision of the Court below.

While the

legislative delegation of authority to the COMMISSION did
no violence to the doctrine of the separation of powers
inasmuch as the COMMISSION did not assume the functions of
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the judiciary, there is no question that in exercising its
legislatively delegated powers, the COMMISSION acts quasijudicially.
Moreover, it does not require judicial lawmaking to
exclude the quasi-judicial deliberative sessions of the
COMMISSION from the coverage of the Open and Public Meetings Act.

To the contrary, the clear language of the

Statute and an examination of its legislative history require nothing less.
Finally, the due process mandate of a fair and impartial tribunal is equally at home in the setting of a
quasi-judicial administrative hearing as it is in the
courtroom.

In fact, there is little difference in the

procedures employed or the safeguards applied.

It is

fundamental to both that the trier of fact be free from
external pressure and influence and that the sanctity of
private deliberations which promote the open and free
exchange of ideas and the candid examination of the evidence be safeguarded whether the fact finding body be a
public agency or a jury.

These basic principles of fair-

ness cannot be skirted by drawing artificial lines of
demarcation between a legislatively created quasi-judicial
body and a court.

Neither the Constitution of this State

nor of the United States make such a distinction in guarantying to their citizens the protection of their property
by due process of law.
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The sophistry of the COMMON CAUSE argument that the
legislature may do as it wishes in establishing the
procedures for the public agencies which it creates must
not be permitted to blur this Court's focus on the fundamental issues of fairness and justice presented by this
case.
Respectfully submitted,
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